In the context of the current global COVID‐19 pandemic, most countries have put in place measures that thoroughly restrict personal freedom in order to contain the contagion rate. In the West, these measures, often contoured with a war‐like narrative, have been hailed either as a scary manifestation of the 'state of exception' (the epidemic being seen as a justification for the expansion of governmental techniques) or as a healthy return of public powers on the scene of politics (for instance, through the newly affirmed prominence of public healthcare systems over private ones) worthwhile of popular support. It seems pertinent to wonder: what will be the legacy of the COVID‐19 pandemic with regards to the State?

The scenario I'm envisaging is the following: the reaction to the COVID‐19 pandemic might set a benchmark, standing as a point of reference for future crises -- such as those that will be brought about with increasing frequency by the effects of global warming. In Europe, with the EU struggling to prove united in the face of the pandemic, States are left alone dealing with the crisis and its complicated aftermath. In this context, a reinvigorated State might sound seductive to many in the progressive field too, appearing as the platform to drive the ecological transition and the implementation of radical policies -- in other words, the actor for a sovereign reinstitution of 'normality' through stronger intervention in the economy, higher funding to public healthcare and the ability to close borders whenever needed. Until recently, in Europe, the State seemed doomed either to dissolve within the super‐national Europeanist project or to become the actor of a worrisome return of xenophobic nationalism (so‐called *souverainism*). In the wake of this crisis, will it resurge as a more cross‐cuttingly legitimised political, economic and moral actor?

But would this be the correct way to learn from this crisis? In a global context where national constitutions are progressively losing their grip on political and economic reality, we should be wary of the promise of a nationally bounded and publicly funded 'normality' to come. The State response to the current crisis, after all, has not been founded so far on the effective application of its logic, but rather on a *suspension* of the latter -- not on its supposed ability to coordinate resources, but on the mere deployment of police. Moreover, it is not easy to tell when this crisis will be over. Until either a vaccine or effective treatment for COVID‐19 is found, in fact, new periods of restrictions are likely to be necessary in the near future. 'Normality' will probably look different from how we remember it -- whatever 'normality' ever meant, and whoever that 'we' designates.

What is at stake in this crisis and its aftermath is the political ecology to come -- the infrastructures that should make these ruins inhabitable. Is it really the State we need so much?
